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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STA.TE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH by and through 
its Road Commission, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
STYLE-CRETE, Inc., a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
10902 
APPELLANT'S REPL y- BRIEF 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The original briefs adequately set out the nature 
of the case, its disposition in the lower court, and the 
relief sought on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent asserts that appellant's brief did not 
conform to procedural requirements in that not all of 
1 
the evidence was included, and such facts as were 
included were not presented "in a light most favorable 
to support" the respondent's case. Such a requirement, 
like the respondent's history of eminent domain pro-
ceedings in the district courts of Utah, must exist only 
in the mind of counsel. Rule 75 (p), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, was amended to restrict the statement 
of facts to those "material" to the appeal. 
Respondent correctly observed at page 14 of its 
brief that appellant has not contended that the evidence 
was insufficient to support the verdict. The primary 
questions raised on appeal concern the refusal of the 
trial court to permit evidence of, and instruct with 
respect to, the availability of other property and its 
effect on respondent's damages. The facts set out by 
appellant were the ones material to those questions. The 
jury had not been asked whether any particular factor 
relied upon by respondent caused or contributed to its 
damages. As to all factors except the size and shape of 
the remaining land the jury might have found either 
way; but it was not permitted to consider whether the 
damages would have been minimized by the acquisition 
of other land and the rearrangement of the respondent's 
concrete plant. 
Respondent's statement contains a number of 
"facts" that were only opinions of particular witnesses, 
contrary to the opinions of other witnesses. No infer-
ences may be drawn from appellant's failure to have 
a witness contradict the testimony of A. R. Caldwell. 
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His credibility and the relevance of his testimony were 
successfully attacked on cross-examination .. Moreover, 
the need for such a witness was not suggested by re-
spondent's pleadings or the pre-trial order ( R. 121-
123, 812, and 889-894). 
The statement at page 12 of respondent's brief 
that it had not offered any evidence that the property 
constituted "an economic unit dependent on its size for 
full value" before condemnation is true only to the extent 
that respondent did not use the term "economic unit." 
Style-Crete's owners, its appraiser, and its other experts 
t.estified that one of the elements rendering the building 
unsuitable for any use other than dead storage was the 
reduced size of the parcel upon which the plant is 
located. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
1'he question of the availability of other property 
was necessarily included in the issues made by the pre-
trial order and the pleadings. 
Style-Crete's claim that "no issue of 'availability 
of replacement land' was raised by the pleadings or 
incorporated within the pre-trial order" (Brief, p. 15) 
is not correct. In one of its answers Style-Crete suggests 
it will be necessary to spend substantial sums of money 
to build ramps to connect two of its parcels ( R. 10-11) 
after construction of 23rd 'Vest Street. In another 
3 
answer (R. 892) it avers that the taking of the property 
for the railroad and 23rd West Street "destroys the 
existing construction site for a substantial addition to 
the cast stone plant," and "requires this defendant to 
relocate and construct an enlarged office and other plant 
facilities in another location." The pre-trial order pro-
vides (R. 122) that in each case the property being 
taken bi-sects Style-Crete's property and that higher-
than-usual severance damages are claimed because of 
the elevation of the road. 
The pre-trial order made no attempt to set out the 
various factors contributing to the amount of severance 
damages. The question of the availability of other 
property and its effect upon the concrete plant is rm-
plicit in the pleadings and pre-trial order. 
II 
Under the "before and after rule" relied upon by 
respondent evidence of the availability of other land is 
material. 
The difference between "damages" to remaining 
property, and "value" of property taken, is recognized 
in Utah constitutional and statutory provisions govern-
ing eminent domain, and in the cases which refer to 
"severance damages," and the duty to "mitigate" them. 
Nevertheless, there is merit in respondent's position 
that the modern trend in eminent domain cases and 
texts is toward a test of "before" and "after" market 
values, even where portions of the damages are based 
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upon m1ury to property not taken. This change in 
approach, however, does not answer the question of 
whether a court should take into consideration the avail-
ability of other land to replace land previously used 
with the remaining parcel. 
On pages 17 and 18 of its brief, Style-Crete touches 
011 the problem but stops short. It recognizes, as would 
be expected, that all factors "which reasonably tend to 
depreciate" the remainder may be taken into account 
in determining after value, but it does not acknowledge 
that factors "which reasonably tend to appreciate" the 
remainder should also be taken into account. The 
authorities relied upon by the respondent do acknowl-
edge it. In 4 Nichols on Eminent Domain (3rd Ed.) 
::I4.247, in a discussion of expenses incurred by the 
owner in taking preventive measures, the writer states 
that it is proper, and in many cases essential, that the 
owner take preventive measures by which he may be 
able to restore, at least to a certain extent, if not com-
pletely, the potentiality of such property for the use 
of which he has been deprived." Although Professor 
Nichols is among the "before-after" advocates, he cites 
in support of his statement City of St. Louis v. St. 
Louis I~I&SR Co., 272 Mo. 80, 197 S."V\T. 107 (1917), 
so disdained by respondents. 
The authority also says ( 4 Nichols on Eminent 
Domain, §14.22) : 
""\Vhen the damage to the owner's remaining 
property can be avoided by grading or repairs, 
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and the reasonable cost of such work is less than 
the decrease in the market value of the real 
estate, such cost forms the measure of damages." 
The rule on minimization can be rationalized as 
either "mitigation" (under a "damage" theory of sever-
ance), or as affecting the value of the remaining prop-
erty (under a "before and after" theory). This is made 
clear from the cases dealing with this problem. 
In State Highway Commission v. Hayes Estate, 
140 N.W.2d 680 ( S.D., 1966), which involved a partial 
taking and damage to property not taken, the South 
Dakota Supreme Court considered the effects of "re-
habilitation, rearrangement, restoration and readjust-
ment," saying: 
"In estimating damages to the remainder, or 
in other words, the depreciation in value of the 
part not taken, the land owner is entitled to have 
the jury apprised as to all those facts which 
legitimately bear upon the market value * * * 
before and after the taking, and those factors 
that would ordinarily influence a prospective 
customer in negotiating for the property. 
" * * * it is proper to take into consideration 
the expenses made necessary by the improvement 
* * * in order to restore the land to its most ad-
vantageous use, or in adjusting it to the changed 
conditions brought about by the taking * * * " 
In Edgecomb Steel of New England v. State, 100 
N.H. 480, 131 A.2d 70 (1957), the court discussed the 
severance damage problem as follows: 
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"The state as condemnor was not necessarily 
to be held liable for damages upon the theory 
that the value of what remained after condem-
nation was substantially reduced because it was 
no longer usable for the purpose for which it was 
designed. If by provision for expansion in an-
other direction the most advantageous use of the 
plaintiff's land could still be preserved, its value 
was to be determined in light of that prospect." 
In In re Widening of Michigan Avenue etc., 280 
Mich. 539, 273 N.W. 798, 802 (1937), the Supreme 
Court of Michigan said: 
"\Vhere only a part of a building is taken, if 
the remaining portion is of great value and there 
can be advantageous reconstruction, rearrange-
men and new adjustment, then the cost of alter-
ing the building and all consequential damages 
because of such alteration, plus the value of the 
part taken, furnishes the rule for measuring the 
compensation to be awarded. If what remains 
after a part is taken is worthless, the jury should 
allow the whole value of the building. If not, they 
should consider what may be done with the re-
mainder and the cost of doing it." 
The concept and the case were cited and quoted 
with approval in Highway Department of State of 
Michigan v. Dake Corporation, 357 Mich. 20, 97 N.W. 
2d 748 (1959). 
Another case dealing with the rehabilitation or 
reconstruction of property to minimize damages is 
Pima County et al v. De Concini et ux., 79 Ariz. 154, 
285 P 2d 609, 611 ( 1955), wherein the court said: 
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"The rule also is that in arriving at the market 
value of land which has been damaged by the 
exercise of the right of eminent domain the court 
has a right to admit evidence of possible expen-
ditures which, if expended, would diminish the 
damages. While the measure of severance dam-
ages is the difference between the market value 
before and after the taking, evidence of expen-
ditures which, if made, would cause a change 
in market value are admissible and should be 
considered by the court in arriving at such value." 
The purchase of additional property is but one 
kind of expenditure which might be made to diminish 
damages by rehabilitation, rearrangement, restoration 
and readjustment of the property. 
The hypothetical buyer and seller relied upon by 
respondent differ from those found in the cases. Style-
Crete argues that the issue is not whether the railroad 
vibrations will damage concrete, but whether the "will-
ing buyer" would be influenced by his belief that they 
would. This argument is specious. It ignores the 
universal requirement that the hypothetical willing 
buyer and willing seller must be "fully informed." 
Certainly an informed purchaser of a concrete plant 
would understand the characteristics of setting concrete 
and the effect of random vibrations. Popular miscon-
ceptions would not determine the market value of a 
concrete plant. 
Respondent cites Southern Pacific Company v. 
Arthur et al., IO Utah 2d 306, 352 P .2d 693 ( 1960), 
as a case restricting application of the rule that avail-
8 
ability of other land should be considered. The case has 
few similarities with the present one. There the property 
had special value because it was the customary route 
by which sheep were moved from one side of the valley 
to another. The court correctly observed that evidence 
of availability was immaterial "under the above facts" 
because "the damage to the remaining lands cannot be 
mitigated by obtaining other lands in other places." 
(Emphasis added.) .Moreover, the error claimed with 
respect to availability of other property was an after-
thought, the condemnor having objected to introduction 
of evidence of the unavailability of other land; and no 
instructons having been requested concerning unavail-
ability. (See Briefs of the Supreme Court of Utah, 
Vol. 713, Case No. 9123, Brief of Defendants, Respond-
ents, and Cross-Appellants, page 45.) 
In Style-Crete's supplemental "Citation of Newly 
Decided Case, etc." served on February 5, 1968, great 
reliance is placed upon State of Utah v. Howes, Bing-
ham, et al., Case No. 10831, handed down by this Court 
of January 23, 1968. Insofar as the case bears upon 
the technical accuracy of appellant's Requested In-
struction No. 15, it is in point, because it refuses to 
place on the condemnee the burden contended for in 
that instruction. 
But the case was decided on a narrow technical 
issue of whether a condemnee has the burden of proving 
a negative, viz., that other property is not available 
to replace that taken by the c9ndemnor. The case does 
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not suggest that evidence of the availability of other 
land is not relevant, material and admissible; and in 
the instant case the State Road Commission attempted 
cross-examine Style-Crete's witnesses with respect to 
the effect of additional property on the severance 
damages, and to introduce independent evidence that 
such property was available. The trial court simply 
would not let the issue be tried. 
Recognition of the materiality of evidence of the 
availability of other land which might be economically 
used with the owner's remaining land is not tantamount 
to requiring him to go out and buy property which he 
may not want, or cannot afford. The rule is said to 
apply only if "reasonable cost of such work is less than 
the decrease in the market value" Nichols, op. cit. 
§14.22). And the owner need not buy; he may sell. 
Admission of evidence that other property can be 
obtained for use with the owner's remaining property 
is proper because a hypothetical "willing buyer," inter-
ested in acquiring property of an optimum acreage, 
would be influenced by the fact that other available 
property could be used in conjunction with the property 
he is about to purchase. The "willing seller" would also 
be expected to consider this. Accordingly, the avail-
ability of other property, like other factors (such as 
the cost of rehabilitation, filling the property if low, 
scraping it if high, and so forth) has a direct bearing 
upon the market value. Buyer and seller would fix the 
price of the property in light of what had to be done 
to it and what properties might have to be bought for 
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use with it. The purchase of additional property quali-
tatively is no different than the purchase of fill material, 
or the hiring of bulldozers or carpenters to rehabilitate 
and reconstruct. 
The obligation to minimize damages should not be 
limited (as argued at page 24 of Respondent's Brief) 
to cases in which there was a "formerly balanced eco-
nomic land unit." "Balanced" implies something that is 
not necessary for the rule, and restricts the application 
of the rule beyond its obvious purpose. Size and shape 
are the important factors. And there is no requirement 
that the "substituted propery will be of the same 
functional use and will cure the severance damage." As 
pointed out above, even Professor Nichols, in talking 
about minimization of damage, talks about restoration 
of the property "to a certain extent, if not completely." 
The cases recognize that restoration costs may be 
properly inquired into if the after value of the property, 
after deducting restoration costs, would require the 
payment of less compensation than the payment of the 
after market value of the property. 
This view was incorporated into appellant's re-
quested Instruction No. 15. Respondent's interpretation 
of that instruction as set forth at pages 29 and 30 
of its brief is neither reasonable nor allowable. The 
requested instruction is almost an inversion of the 
Nichols Formula ( § 14.23) for cases in which the cost 
of restoration will result in a decrease in damage to the 
remainder: 
11 
"Value of part taken + Cost of rehabilitation 
- ,.,. alue recovered by reconstruction = Just 
compensation." 
III 
The State was not "bound" by the testimony of its 
appraiser. 
Style-Crete argues that inasmuch as the appraiser 
called by the state believed that the highest and best 
use of the Parcel "B'' remainder was no longer operation 
of a concrete plant, the state was precluded from intro-
ducing contrary testimony and from arguing to the 
jury that one or another fact assumed by the appraiser 
did not exist. 
The law does not support the contention. There 
was no attempt on the part of the state to "impeach" 
its own witnesses. It is well-known that appraisers are 
not usually "concrete" experts; and their judgments 
often are based upon information obtained from others. 
If such information is erroneous, the jury should be 
so shown. 
As was pointed out by this court in Schlatter v. 
McCarthy et al., 113 Utah 543, 196 P.2d 968, 975 
(1948): 
"***but a party is not bound by every state-
ment that his witness makes, and he may, by 
testimony of other witnesses and in argument to 
the jury, show that the facts were different from 
those testified to by the witness. This is permitted 
not for the purpose of impeaching the witness 
12 
(although it may have that incidental effect), 
but for establishing the true facts. It would be 
a monstrous rule that would bind a party to every 
witness produced by him. * * *" 
Accord: II I TVigmore on Evidence (3rd Ed.), §907; 
McCormick on Evidence, §47. 
vVith respect to items as to which there was a 
conflict in the evidence, the State had the right to argue 
to the jury that the supposed damages did not exist. 
The state had not been able to frame a hypothetical 
question to its appraiser with respect to a complete 
cure of Style-Crete's damages because the appraiser 
himself had expressed the opinion that the size of Parcel 
"B" precluded continued operation of its concrete plant; 
and the court had not permitted the State to show that 
the size problem could be cured by the acquisition of 
other property. 
CONCLUSION 
In those instances in which the size and shape of 
the remaining parcel of property, after condemnation, 
affect the value of or damages to that remainder, 
evidence should be presented as to the availability of 
other property through which the remainder might be 
rehabilitated, rearranged, restored and readjusted. 
Such evidence is material, relevant, and important, 
whether the Court follows a "damage" or "before and 
after value" theory. In either case the availability of 
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other property has an influence upon the amount of 
money needed to compensate the owner. 
The trial court prevented the State from presenting 
evidence to support its theory that the building on 
Parcel "B" could thereafter be used for a concrete plant 
if Style-Crete's officers had taken reasonable steps to 
protect its property and rearrange the concrete opera-
tion. If the judgment is not reversed, the probability 
exists that Style-Crete will have its concrete plant and 
damages for abandonment, too-a result which should 
not occur unless the parties have been afforded an 
opportunity to present evidence on all of the material 
issues. The judgment of the trial court should be 
reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
BRYCE E. ROE 
Special Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Appellant 
510 American Oil Building 
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